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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a model for donation verification. A randomized algorithm is
developed to check if the money claimed being received by the collector is (1− ǫ)-approximation
to the total amount money contributed by the donors. We also derive some negative results
that show it is impossible to verify the donations under some circumstances.
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1. Introduction
Worldwide billions of dollars are donated for charities. For example, United States alone gave over
335 billion dollars for philanthropy in 2013. When this much money is involved there would also
be fraudsters who take advantage of ones generosity. Recognizing fraudulent practices, US Federal
Trade Commission has given a number of things to check before giving to charity. The efficiency of a
charitable organization is currently determined by the percentage of fund actually end up being used
for intended purpose. CharityWatch [http://www.charitywatch.org/criteria.html] concludes 60% or
greater spent on charitable programs and the remaining spent on overhead is acceptable. However,
currently no algorithms are available to detects errors in reporting of monies donated. Donors merely
trust the data provided by the charitable organizations or charts published by organizations such as
Charity Navigator [http://www.charitynavigator.org]. Some research regarding charity donations
and their management have been conducted in the academic community [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. We have not
seen any existing research about how donors check the amount of money received by the collector.
It is essential to develop some algorithm that the donors and charitable organizations use to trust
each other.
With the development of charity donations in the modern society, it becomes a more and more
important social problem about charity donation system. In addition to establishing related laws,
it is also essential to build up efficient auditing systems about charity donations, and apply big
data technology to manage them. The progression in this direction will bring efficient and accurate
methods for charity donations, which will improve our social reliability.
In this paper we develop a method that would allow us to verify monies received by charitable
organizations. It would be difficult for every donor to verify each philanthropic organization. Our
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Figure 1: Donation Tree with D(.) Values
method is based on a randomized model thereby reducing the number of verifications. Using our
algorithm, even if only a small percentage of the donors participate in the verification process,
incorrect data given by the philanthropic organizations (cheating) can be detected. With just few
steps a donor can verify if the money is used for intended purpose with a high degree of probability.
2. Models
Assume that there are n people who donated money. Person i donates si. In this model, we assume
that each person checks his donation with probability 1−e−λs if he donated s amount money, where
λ is fixed. This model means that a person will have larger chance to check his donation if he
contributes more money. We define a donation tree.
Definition 1. We define a donation tree. For each leaf L in a donation tree, its donation value is
defined to be D(L). For node N in a tree T , define D(N) to be the sum of values D(.) in its leaves
of the subtree with root at N . For each node D, function V (N) is the amount money that the
collector claims from the donors at the leaves of the subtree with root at N . An error path from a
leaf to the root has a node N with V (N) < V (N1)+ · · ·+V (Nk), where N1, · · · , Nk are the children
of N in T , and V (N) be the vale saved in node N .
A donation tree without cheating should be the case D(N) = V (N) for all nodes in the tree. We
have the donation tree without cheating at Figure 1.
Let k be an integer at least 2. A k-donation tree is a donation tree such that each internal node
has at most k children. The money donated from one donor is at a leaf. For every node saves N , the
total money D(N) of leave below it, and a value V (N) ≤ D(N) to represents the amount of money
the collector claiming to have received from the leaves. In the case V (N) < D(N), it is considered
a cheating from the collector.
3. Algorithm and Its Analysis
In this section, we develop an algorithm for this problem.
Lemma 2. For each integer k ≥ 2, A k-donation tree can be built in O(n) time offline with depth
O(log n). It also supports an O(log n) time for both insertion and deletion.
Proof: A divide and conquer method can be used to build a donation tree of depth O(log n) with
O(n) time offline (the input of donations from n people are given). If it based on the structure of
B+-tree, then it can support O(log n) time for both insertion and deletion.
Protocol
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Figure 2: Donation Tree without Cheating
Collector:
Generate a file F that a donation tree.
Publish the file F .
donor mi:
Check if his donation (D(mi) = V (mi)).
For each node N on the path from mi to the tree root m0, check if V (N) = V (N1) + · · ·+
V (Nk), where N1, · · · , Nk are all children of N .
Report error path if at least one of the two checks fails.
End of Protocol
Lemma 3. Assume that the root N of the donation tree T has a value V (N) < D(N). There
are leaves m1, · · · ,mk in the tree that all have error paths to root, and D(m1) + · · · + D(mk) ≥
D(N)− V (N).
Proof: We prove it by induction. It is trivial when the depth is 0. Assume that the statement
is true for the depth at most d. Consider the depth d+ 1. Let N be a node of depth d+ 1 and has
children N1, · · · , Nk.
Case 1. V (N) < V (N1) + · · ·+ V (Nk), then every leaf has a error path.
Case 2. V (N) ≥ V (N1) + · · ·+ V (Nk). Let Ni1 , · · · , Nit be all of the nodes of N1, · · · , Nk such
that V (Nis) < D(Nis). We have
t∑
j=1
(D(Nij )− V (Nij )) ≥
k∑
a=1
(D(Na)− V (Na)) (1)
≥ D(N)− V (N). (2)
We note that for each a ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} − {i1, · · · , it}, D(Na)− V (Na) ≤ 0.
By induction hypothesis, for each ij , there are leave lij ,1, · · · , lij ,u under the subtree with root at
Nij such that D(lij ,1)+· · ·+D(lij ,u) ≥ D(Nij )−V (Nij ). Let Hj = {lij ,1, · · · , lij ,u} for j = 1, 2, · · · , t.
Let H be the set of all leave mi ∈ H1 ∪ · · ·Ht, we have
∑
mi∈H
D(mi) ≥ D(N)− V (N).
3.1. Random Verification with Exponential Distribution
In this section, we consider the case that donor join the verification by following exponential distri-
bution. The people who donate more money have higher probability to do the verification than the
people who donate less money.
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Theorem 4. Assume integer k ≥ 2 and there are n donors. Each verify takes O(kh steps, and
reports error if it is not an (1− ǫ)-approximation in the report with probability at least 1− δ, where
δ = O(e−λǫM ) and h is the depth of the tree.
Proof: Let M = D(R) where R is the root of the donation tree. Assume that there is at least
ǫM error (D(R)− V (R) ≥ ǫD(R)).
Let m1,m2, · · · ,mt be nodes with error paths to root of the tree, and have
∑t
i=1mi ≥ ǫM by
Lemma 3.
If one of m1,m2, · · · ,mt checks its path to the root, then an error (or cheating ) can be detected.
Therefore, this problem becomes to compute the probability that none of m1,m2, · · · ,mt does his
verification.
The probability that none of them checks is at most e−λm1 · e−λm2 · · · e−λmt ≤ e−λǫM .
3.2. An Implementation with B-Tree
A donation tree can be implemented with a B-tree that supports O(log n) time for searching, inser-
tion, and deletion. When an new leave is inserted, we can update all V (N) for node N affected in
O(log n) time. Similarly, When an new leave is deleted, we can update all V (N) for node N affected
in O(log n) time.
3.3. Uniform Random Verification
In this section, we consider the case that donor join the verification by following uniform distribution.
Theorem 5. Assume that each person donates the money in the range [1, a], each donor participates
in the verification with probability at least δ. Then it takes O(logk n) steps, and reports error with
probability at least 1− (1 − δ)⌈
eM
a ⌉.
Proof: Assume that M is the total amount of money donated by all the people. If it is not an
(1 − ǫ)-approximation, then there are at least ǫMa error paths corresponding to at least k =
⌈
ǫM
a
⌉
donors. With probability at most (1− δ)k = (1− δ)⌈
ǫM
a ⌉, none of them will attend the verification.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− (1− δ)⌈
eM
a ⌉, the error of the report will be detected.
3.4. Multiple Verification Regions
In this section, we show the verification in several region. If each person donates amount in the range
[a0, a]. The interval is partitioned into [a0, a1), [a1, a2), · · · , [ak−1, ak]. We assume people different
region have different probability to participate the verification.
Theorem 6. Assume that [a0, a1), [a1, a2), · · · , [ak−1, ak] form a partition for [a0, a] with ai + 1 ≤
ai(1 + δ) for i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , k − 1. Let Ij = [aj , aj+1) if j < k, and Ik = [ak−1, ak]. Let pj be the
probability that a person with donation range in Ij verifies. Then there is a verification protocol
such that with probability at most
∑k−1
j=0 (1− pj)
ǫMj/(1+δ) to fail to check 1− ǫ approximation, where
Mj is the total amount of donation with each donation in Ij . Furthermore, the verification time is
O(log n+ k).
Proof: Use one verification tree Tj for each Ij . Form a tree T by linking T1, · · · , Tk−1 as children.
It follows from Theorem 5.
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Figure 3: Donation Tree with Cheating. Both nodes f and g can find the cheating problem at their
paths to the root. For example, at node c, V (c) < V (f) + V (g).
4. Impossibilities of Verification
In this section, we show that it is impossible to use uniform probability to do donation verification.
We also prove that it is impossible to do verification if negative items are allowed.
Theorem 7. There is no randomized algorithm fail to detect the cheating from collector with prob-
ability at most δ if every donor checks his donation with probability at most δ.
Proof: Let k = 9. Imagine the collector receives M amount money with Mk from one donor A.
He releases a document that includes all the money from the others except A. If A does not verify
it, it should be all correct without any error. Therefore, with probability at most δ, the verification
fails.
Theorem 8. There is no randomized algorithm fail to detect the cheating with negative donation
allowed from collector with probability at most δ if one donor checks his donation with probability at
most δ.
Proof: Let the sum of n−2 donors m1, · · · ,mn−2 be equal to M . Let the donor n−1 contributes
1 or 0, and donor n contributes −M . Consider the first case that donor n − 1 contributes 1. The
total is equal to 1.
Consider the second case that donor n− 1 contributes 0. The total is equal to 0. If that donor
n− 1 takes probability at most δ to do verification, then we have probability at most δ to make the
difference of the two cases.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a protocol for the donation verification under some probabilistic assump-
tion. It only expects the donors follow certain probabilistic distribution to attend verification, and
takes O(log n) steps for each donor.
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